Coming soon to RBR...http://www.musicallies.com/anaismitchell/
(Excited yet?)
Friday, December 15, 2006
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
Karamazov
The Brothers Karamazov
Part Two, Book 6: the Russian Monk, Chapter 3: from Talks and Homilies of the Elder Zosima, (e) Some Words about the Russian Monk and His Possible Significance
...The world has proclaimed freedom, especially of late, but what do we see in this freedom of theirs: only slavery and suicide! For the world says: "you have needs, therefore satisfy them, for you have the same rights as the noblest and richest men. Do not be afraid to satisfy them, but even increase them" -- this is the current teaching of the world. And in this they see freedom. But what comes of this right to increase one's needs? For the rich, isolation and spiritual suicide; for the poor, envy and murder, for they have been given rights, but have not yet been shown any way of satisfying their needs. We are assured that the world is becoming more and more united, is being formed into brotherly communion, by the shortening of distances, by the transmitting of thoughts through the air. Alas, do not believe in such a union of people. Taking freedom to mean the increase and prompt satisfaction of needs, they distort their own nature, for they generate many meaningless and foolish desires, habits, and the most absurd fancies in themselves. They live only for mutual envy, for pleasure-seeking and self-display. To have dinners, horses, carriages, rank, and slaves to serve them is now considered such a necessity that for the sake of it, to satisfy, they will sacrifice life, honor, the love of mankind, and will even kill themselves if they are unable to satisfy it. We see the same thing in those who are not rich, while the poor, so far, simply drown their unsatisfied needs and envy in drink. But soon they will get drunk on blood instead of wine, they are being led to that. I ask you: is such a man free? I knew one "fighter for an idea" who told me himself that when he was deprived of tobacco in prison, he was so tormented by this deprivation that he almost went and betrayed his "idea," just so that they would give him tobacco. And such a man says: "I am going to fight for mankind." Well, how far will such a man get, and what is he good for? Perhaps some quick action, but he will not endure for long. And no wonder that instead of freedom they have fallen into slavery, and instead of serving brotherly love and human unity, they have fallen, on the contrary, into disunity and isolation, as my mysterious visitor and teacher used to tell me in my youth. And therefore the idea of serving mankind, of the brotherhood and oneness of people, is fading more and more in the world, and indeed the idea now even meets with mockery, for how can one drop one's habits, where will this slave go now that he is so accustomed to satisfying the innumerable needs he himself has invented? He is isolated, and what does he care about the whole? They have succeeded in amassing more and more things, but have less and less joy.
Part Two, Book 6: the Russian Monk, Chapter 3: from Talks and Homilies of the Elder Zosima, (e) Some Words about the Russian Monk and His Possible Significance
...The world has proclaimed freedom, especially of late, but what do we see in this freedom of theirs: only slavery and suicide! For the world says: "you have needs, therefore satisfy them, for you have the same rights as the noblest and richest men. Do not be afraid to satisfy them, but even increase them" -- this is the current teaching of the world. And in this they see freedom. But what comes of this right to increase one's needs? For the rich, isolation and spiritual suicide; for the poor, envy and murder, for they have been given rights, but have not yet been shown any way of satisfying their needs. We are assured that the world is becoming more and more united, is being formed into brotherly communion, by the shortening of distances, by the transmitting of thoughts through the air. Alas, do not believe in such a union of people. Taking freedom to mean the increase and prompt satisfaction of needs, they distort their own nature, for they generate many meaningless and foolish desires, habits, and the most absurd fancies in themselves. They live only for mutual envy, for pleasure-seeking and self-display. To have dinners, horses, carriages, rank, and slaves to serve them is now considered such a necessity that for the sake of it, to satisfy, they will sacrifice life, honor, the love of mankind, and will even kill themselves if they are unable to satisfy it. We see the same thing in those who are not rich, while the poor, so far, simply drown their unsatisfied needs and envy in drink. But soon they will get drunk on blood instead of wine, they are being led to that. I ask you: is such a man free? I knew one "fighter for an idea" who told me himself that when he was deprived of tobacco in prison, he was so tormented by this deprivation that he almost went and betrayed his "idea," just so that they would give him tobacco. And such a man says: "I am going to fight for mankind." Well, how far will such a man get, and what is he good for? Perhaps some quick action, but he will not endure for long. And no wonder that instead of freedom they have fallen into slavery, and instead of serving brotherly love and human unity, they have fallen, on the contrary, into disunity and isolation, as my mysterious visitor and teacher used to tell me in my youth. And therefore the idea of serving mankind, of the brotherhood and oneness of people, is fading more and more in the world, and indeed the idea now even meets with mockery, for how can one drop one's habits, where will this slave go now that he is so accustomed to satisfying the innumerable needs he himself has invented? He is isolated, and what does he care about the whole? They have succeeded in amassing more and more things, but have less and less joy.
Wednesday, December 06, 2006
Thoughts on the report of the Iraq Study Group
Peaceful democracies exist on the consent of both the majority and the minority.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration decided that the existing sanctions-based foreign policy in Iraq was insufficient to protect American interests. Equating the long escalation of Al Qaeda attacks throughout the 90s with the violent history and murderous nature of the Hussein regime (as well as declining enforcement of UN sanctions), the administration understood the lesson of the terrorist strikes as follows: threats conveniently dismissed or ignored when small will in time become catastrophic realities. Further, it would seem that the administration hoped another lesson was possible: that through early, massive, and forceful consequences (and perhaps only through this) could future catastrophic realities be nipped in the bud.
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq provided the opportunity to project this lesson (and test the theory).
The US invasion of Iraq was publicly justified on two bases: the need to protect ourselves from imminent danger, and an opportunity to undermine the causes of terrorism (which were considered to be repressive governments unresponsive to the needs and grievances of their populations and protecting their power through vilification of outsiders, especially the United States and Israel).
It was not important that the Iraqi threat to the United States or the world be imminent in order to demonstrate that any potential threat to the United States or the world would be met with early, massive and forceful consequences. It was only important that some threat be acknowledged, and some intransigence on the part of the threatening regime be demonstrated. At that point, the lesson could be taught.
However, the administration was operating in a domestic and international political climate that was not necessarily conducive to destroying the Iraqi regime merely to set an example. Thus it was important to establish the "burning platform" of an imminent chemical, biological or nuclear threat, and/or terrorist connection (ideally to the attacks of September 11). It would be unfair to suggest that all these threats were known to be false. It is more accurate to say that a moderate, reasonably well-controlled threat was widely perceived, with a great deal of vague/questionable/conflicting information that made it easy for anyone so inclined to connect the dots as they saw fit. Contradictory dots of whatever suggestion were often ignored. It is fair to blame decision-makers at this phase for ignoring "inconvenient truths" for fear of seeming indecisive or worse obstructionist.
As time and events disproved the imminence of the Iraqi threat, the legitimacy of the American-led invasion fell back on the secondary justification of planting the seeds of democracy in a Middle Eastern garden of misdirected anger. This is a key point. The domestic political and international legitimacy of American actions was at this point tied to the concept of democratic government in Iraq. Leaving with success, "winning", became acquainted with leaving a democratic government behind.
Bob Gates, the newly-appointed Secretary of Defense, acknowledged in testimony this week that the American-led forces are not "winning" in Iraq.
And yet, a democratic government is in place. Again, this is important. We have achieved democracy in Iraq, and yet we have not succeeded. Something is missing. That something is peace, or as it is more fashionably known, stability.
Peaceful (stable) democracies exist on the consent of both the majority and minority.
Until the American-led invasion in 2002, Iraq was governed by a minority Sunni population who dominated the Shi'ite majority through severe repression. Establishing democracy in Iraq required by definition that a majority be empowered. The rules by which the Iraqi constitution was drawn up, and thus the basis for Iraqi democracy, depend in large part on religious identity. (In fairness religious identity was already a significant factor for many people, especially in light of the history of Sunni domination of the Shi'ite majority.) Thus, minority domination of the majority was replaced with majority domination of the minority.
This is democracy: majority rules.
Peaceful, stable democracies, though, have an additional requirement. The minority must agree to live peacefully on the terms of the majority. Thus we have the concept of minority rights within a framework of majority rules.
This is peaceful democracy: majority rules, minority rights.
When Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans took power in the late 19th century, the previously dominant Southern Democrats foresaw the terms under which they would be ruled (namely, curtailment or elimination of slavery) and refused to live peacefully on the majority terms. Thus began civil war.
When the minority refuses to live peacefully on the terms of the majority, the majority in turn has three options: compromise on the terms, attempt to destroy the minority, or attempt to inflict sufficient damage on the minority such that they will compromise. The first is easiest but only in small measures. The second is tempting but depends on an overwhelming difference in power (and thus it is usually "the terrorists" or "the insurgents" or "the extremists" that are targeted). The usual result is the third option, refusing to compromise and recognizing that no purely military victory is possible, but believing that time (or God) is on one's side.
In the case of Iraq, both the Shi'ite majority in government and the minority Sunni insurgency believe that time is on their side. Vaulted into power by American military might, and viewing their continued dominance as a critical legitimation of the American Democracy Project in the Middle East and thus a justification and definition of success in the Iraq venture, the Shi'ite government feels it will not be allowed to fall. Backed by American guns, the government and the Shi'ite militias feel emboldened in their expectations of dominance over the Sunni minority that once oppressed them. At the same time, the Sunni minority (especially the active militia component) feels disenfranchised and -- in a country where political parties are extensions of ethnic/religious identity -- unlikely to have an opportunity to ever become the majority. They have little reason to respect the legitimacy of a Democratic majority of which they will never become a part. Further, they recognize that as a foreign occupation force taking serious casualties, the American political will for an open-ended support for the Shi'ite government is not sustainable. At some point the Americans will leave, while the Syrians and Iranians will remain as important patrons. Thus the Sunnis see little advantage in submitting to the Shi'ite majority and have every reason to believe that time is on their side.
It is this recognition that the Iraq Study Group grasps, and with which the administration seems to differ. When enough of the minority choose not to live peacefully on the terms of the majority, supporting the legitimate = Democratic = majority is effectively the same as taking sides in a civil war. The Bush administration has taken sides. This in and of itself is not unreasonable. However, when "our side" believes that we have their backs no matter what, and does not have the political will (taking into account militias etc.) to compromise on terms currently acceptable to the minority, and thus our side = the majority believes it is better to fight for improved terms... and at the same time the "other side" believes that we are leaving (sooner or later) and is willing to continue fighting until that day so that they can get improved terms... when both sides' frame of reference tells them that it makes sense to go on killing in order to break the will of the other side, that is the prescription for the downward spiral of civil war we see today.
The Iraq Study Group is saying, in effect, that we have to tell "our side" that the "other side" is right... that we won't be there forever, that time is not on their side, and that they need to get the best compromise they can today. In the language of democracy and terrorists/insurgents/extremists, this is giving in to the "bad guys". In the language of peaceful/stable democracy, though, this is granting additional minority rights in order to avoid (continuing) a civil war.
One thing I found striking, particularly in the discussion with the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, is the extreme difference in tone from that of the administration. It is as if they are saying, we have no leverage over the Sunnis (who we are treating as the bad guys), and very little leverage over the Shi'ites (some of whom make up the government we treat as the good guys). If we want peace, about the best we can hope is to lean on the good guys to cut a deal with the bad guys. And they might not want to, just as in the American Civil War they may prefer to keep killing each other until both sides can see clearly that additional killing will not significantly change the terms of a compromise.
In other words, bluntly, if there is to be peace it will be on the "bad guys'" terms. And we cannot force the good guys to take those terms, but we ought to try.
Of course this is something of an oversimplification. But the judgment that the administration will have to deal with in the coming days and weeks is this: just as in Vietnam, the "good guy" government that we are backing increasingly lacks legitimacy among both the Shi'ite majority and especially the Sunni minority, and it does not appear to be within our military or political power to establish that legitimacy. The only practical hope (and a limited one at that) is that the government, fearing for its own survival, renegotiates its terms of existence.
Only by being willing to sacrifice the democratic government of Iraq, the greatest remaining legitimation of the war, can we hope to transform it into a stable democratic government. If we fail in this, stability will come only after more bloodshed shapes a new government (of whatever form) that will be sufficiently tolerated by all the surviving peoples of Iraq.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration decided that the existing sanctions-based foreign policy in Iraq was insufficient to protect American interests. Equating the long escalation of Al Qaeda attacks throughout the 90s with the violent history and murderous nature of the Hussein regime (as well as declining enforcement of UN sanctions), the administration understood the lesson of the terrorist strikes as follows: threats conveniently dismissed or ignored when small will in time become catastrophic realities. Further, it would seem that the administration hoped another lesson was possible: that through early, massive, and forceful consequences (and perhaps only through this) could future catastrophic realities be nipped in the bud.
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq provided the opportunity to project this lesson (and test the theory).
The US invasion of Iraq was publicly justified on two bases: the need to protect ourselves from imminent danger, and an opportunity to undermine the causes of terrorism (which were considered to be repressive governments unresponsive to the needs and grievances of their populations and protecting their power through vilification of outsiders, especially the United States and Israel).
It was not important that the Iraqi threat to the United States or the world be imminent in order to demonstrate that any potential threat to the United States or the world would be met with early, massive and forceful consequences. It was only important that some threat be acknowledged, and some intransigence on the part of the threatening regime be demonstrated. At that point, the lesson could be taught.
However, the administration was operating in a domestic and international political climate that was not necessarily conducive to destroying the Iraqi regime merely to set an example. Thus it was important to establish the "burning platform" of an imminent chemical, biological or nuclear threat, and/or terrorist connection (ideally to the attacks of September 11). It would be unfair to suggest that all these threats were known to be false. It is more accurate to say that a moderate, reasonably well-controlled threat was widely perceived, with a great deal of vague/questionable/conflicting information that made it easy for anyone so inclined to connect the dots as they saw fit. Contradictory dots of whatever suggestion were often ignored. It is fair to blame decision-makers at this phase for ignoring "inconvenient truths" for fear of seeming indecisive or worse obstructionist.
As time and events disproved the imminence of the Iraqi threat, the legitimacy of the American-led invasion fell back on the secondary justification of planting the seeds of democracy in a Middle Eastern garden of misdirected anger. This is a key point. The domestic political and international legitimacy of American actions was at this point tied to the concept of democratic government in Iraq. Leaving with success, "winning", became acquainted with leaving a democratic government behind.
Bob Gates, the newly-appointed Secretary of Defense, acknowledged in testimony this week that the American-led forces are not "winning" in Iraq.
And yet, a democratic government is in place. Again, this is important. We have achieved democracy in Iraq, and yet we have not succeeded. Something is missing. That something is peace, or as it is more fashionably known, stability.
Peaceful (stable) democracies exist on the consent of both the majority and minority.
Until the American-led invasion in 2002, Iraq was governed by a minority Sunni population who dominated the Shi'ite majority through severe repression. Establishing democracy in Iraq required by definition that a majority be empowered. The rules by which the Iraqi constitution was drawn up, and thus the basis for Iraqi democracy, depend in large part on religious identity. (In fairness religious identity was already a significant factor for many people, especially in light of the history of Sunni domination of the Shi'ite majority.) Thus, minority domination of the majority was replaced with majority domination of the minority.
This is democracy: majority rules.
Peaceful, stable democracies, though, have an additional requirement. The minority must agree to live peacefully on the terms of the majority. Thus we have the concept of minority rights within a framework of majority rules.
This is peaceful democracy: majority rules, minority rights.
When Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans took power in the late 19th century, the previously dominant Southern Democrats foresaw the terms under which they would be ruled (namely, curtailment or elimination of slavery) and refused to live peacefully on the majority terms. Thus began civil war.
When the minority refuses to live peacefully on the terms of the majority, the majority in turn has three options: compromise on the terms, attempt to destroy the minority, or attempt to inflict sufficient damage on the minority such that they will compromise. The first is easiest but only in small measures. The second is tempting but depends on an overwhelming difference in power (and thus it is usually "the terrorists" or "the insurgents" or "the extremists" that are targeted). The usual result is the third option, refusing to compromise and recognizing that no purely military victory is possible, but believing that time (or God) is on one's side.
In the case of Iraq, both the Shi'ite majority in government and the minority Sunni insurgency believe that time is on their side. Vaulted into power by American military might, and viewing their continued dominance as a critical legitimation of the American Democracy Project in the Middle East and thus a justification and definition of success in the Iraq venture, the Shi'ite government feels it will not be allowed to fall. Backed by American guns, the government and the Shi'ite militias feel emboldened in their expectations of dominance over the Sunni minority that once oppressed them. At the same time, the Sunni minority (especially the active militia component) feels disenfranchised and -- in a country where political parties are extensions of ethnic/religious identity -- unlikely to have an opportunity to ever become the majority. They have little reason to respect the legitimacy of a Democratic majority of which they will never become a part. Further, they recognize that as a foreign occupation force taking serious casualties, the American political will for an open-ended support for the Shi'ite government is not sustainable. At some point the Americans will leave, while the Syrians and Iranians will remain as important patrons. Thus the Sunnis see little advantage in submitting to the Shi'ite majority and have every reason to believe that time is on their side.
It is this recognition that the Iraq Study Group grasps, and with which the administration seems to differ. When enough of the minority choose not to live peacefully on the terms of the majority, supporting the legitimate = Democratic = majority is effectively the same as taking sides in a civil war. The Bush administration has taken sides. This in and of itself is not unreasonable. However, when "our side" believes that we have their backs no matter what, and does not have the political will (taking into account militias etc.) to compromise on terms currently acceptable to the minority, and thus our side = the majority believes it is better to fight for improved terms... and at the same time the "other side" believes that we are leaving (sooner or later) and is willing to continue fighting until that day so that they can get improved terms... when both sides' frame of reference tells them that it makes sense to go on killing in order to break the will of the other side, that is the prescription for the downward spiral of civil war we see today.
The Iraq Study Group is saying, in effect, that we have to tell "our side" that the "other side" is right... that we won't be there forever, that time is not on their side, and that they need to get the best compromise they can today. In the language of democracy and terrorists/insurgents/extremists, this is giving in to the "bad guys". In the language of peaceful/stable democracy, though, this is granting additional minority rights in order to avoid (continuing) a civil war.
One thing I found striking, particularly in the discussion with the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, is the extreme difference in tone from that of the administration. It is as if they are saying, we have no leverage over the Sunnis (who we are treating as the bad guys), and very little leverage over the Shi'ites (some of whom make up the government we treat as the good guys). If we want peace, about the best we can hope is to lean on the good guys to cut a deal with the bad guys. And they might not want to, just as in the American Civil War they may prefer to keep killing each other until both sides can see clearly that additional killing will not significantly change the terms of a compromise.
In other words, bluntly, if there is to be peace it will be on the "bad guys'" terms. And we cannot force the good guys to take those terms, but we ought to try.
Of course this is something of an oversimplification. But the judgment that the administration will have to deal with in the coming days and weeks is this: just as in Vietnam, the "good guy" government that we are backing increasingly lacks legitimacy among both the Shi'ite majority and especially the Sunni minority, and it does not appear to be within our military or political power to establish that legitimacy. The only practical hope (and a limited one at that) is that the government, fearing for its own survival, renegotiates its terms of existence.
Only by being willing to sacrifice the democratic government of Iraq, the greatest remaining legitimation of the war, can we hope to transform it into a stable democratic government. If we fail in this, stability will come only after more bloodshed shapes a new government (of whatever form) that will be sufficiently tolerated by all the surviving peoples of Iraq.
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